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In the nineteenth century, diplomacy became more important than ever before for the Ottoman Empire. Because of the weakness of the Empire, as compared to the great powers of Europe, defense of its territories and interests depended more on diplomacy and negotiation than on the use of arrned forees. Diplomacy was a defensiye weapon for the Sultan and the Sublime Porte in more than one way : it could heIp to avoid injury to the Empire; it could try to attract aid for the Empire; and it could try to persuade the European powers that the Empire deserved support from them because it was improving itself by means of a process of reforms and bringing itself closer to westem ways.
Under the pressure of events, the Empire developed a diplomatic system that was more westem than the traditional OUoman methods. The Sultans had always used negotiators and embassies for dealings with other powers, but these had been temporary. From the time of Sultan Mahmud II the Empire sent out permanent ambassadors and ministers to reside in the capitals of other major states, just as the European powers did. Alsa in Mahmud Il's time the office of re'is efendi was change d into that of foreign minister, and after 1836 a more European-st yle ministry developed slowly under the minister's directian. Likewise a new sart of personnel was aUracted to the Foreign Ministry and to a considerable extent trained there, on the job; these were men who were more conversant with European outlooks and methods, who usually know French, and who were more casily able to deal with diplomats from European countries l • These organizational aspects of the modernization of attornan diplomacy are well know.
The manner in which the new diplomatic establishment opera ted is less well known, but this alsa is important. In a short paper it is impossible to survey the course of attornan diplomatic activity throughout the nineteenth century, or even in the Tanzimat period alone. But it is worth while to deseribe and analyze in general terms the characteristics of attornan diplamaey. Theyare here somewhat arbitrarily divided into principles and methods. The evidence for these principles and methods comes from attornan diplomatic documents. A few of them have be en published, but most are still unpublished. I have relied principally on the documents, numbering in the thousands, in the Dışişleri Bakanlığı Hazine-i Evrak in İstanbuL. \,
The first principle which guided the actions of attornan statesmen and diplomats was, of course, that the attornan Empire must be preserved. Fuad Paşa, who was five times foreign minister, emphasized in instructions sent to all attornan representatives abroad that "the first and most important task of a Government is to look to its own preservation"2. In fact, most of the activity of these officials was in same way related to the struggle to prevent the lass of attornan territory, or the lass of governing authority over parts of attornan territory, either to minority peoples within the Empire or to European powers. As one Iate nineteenth-century analysis of i. Carter V. Findley, Burcaucratic Reform in the Attoman Empire : The Sublime Porte, 1789 .1922 (Princeton, 1980 ), chapter 4. Encümend Kuran, Avrupa 'da Osmanlı lkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve llk Elçilerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri, 1793 -1821 (Ankara, 1968 deals with an ear\ier attempt at permanent embasies.
2. Circular of 20 June 1867, published in Austria, Auswatige Angelegenheiten, eurrespuııdeıızeıı des Kaiserlichköniglicheıı Miııisterium des Aussern (Vienna, 1868 (Vienna, -1874 , I (1867), p. 98.
Attoman policy put it, "It was necessary to preserve ourselves, to exist, not to let ourselves be violated or dismembered"'.
A second principle was that the Attoman empire was a state in which all people, of whatever religion, were equal, although it was alsa an Islamic state. Through the Tanzimat period these was less emphasis on Islam as the basis of Attoman foreign relations. Formerly Islamic law was frequently referred to by Attoman diplomats. In 1807, for example, the re'is efendi explained that "the very structure of the Imperial Government rests on the Muslim Şeriat". The war against Russia (1806-1812) occurred, he said, because "in the face of Russia's tricks, the Imperial Government was forced by Muslim law to resist"4. This kind of reference to Muslim law as the basis for foreign policy tends to disappear from the vocabulary of Attoman diplomats after the Tanzimat Fermanı of Gülhane and the closer association with European powers in the Crimean War. Instead, more references appear to the equality of all Attoman subjects. During the Crimean War, for instance, Mehmed Cemil Paşa, who was Attoman ambassador in Paris, asked the French foreign minister not to address Sultan Abdü1mecid any more as "Empercur des Musulmans", which was "unfitting for a Sultan who has equal affection for all his subjects". He should be addressed, said Cemil Paşa, as "Empereur des Attomans", or "Empercur de Turquie", or "Sa Majeste Imperiale"5. In actuality, the Attoman Empire was beginning to act in international relations more like a secular dynastic state, on the model of the major European powers. Islam continued to play a part in Attoman foreign relations, but in a more modern way. it was used by 3. From Aanxli -Pacha, Testament politique (Coulommiers, 1910) , p. 2. This is not by Ali Paşa, but is an apocryphal document composed in the i870s or 1880s by same one, perhaps a European in Gttoman employ. Similar sentiments ari in Ali Paşa's gemıine memorandum of 3 Şaban 1284/20 November 1867, in Ali Fuad, Rical-i mühimme-i siyasiye (İstanbul, 1928) üttoman diplomats as a way of appealing to the modem concept of public opinion, which was much used by other powers of Europe. Not Islamic law, but Islamic opinion became the weapon of the üttoman negotiators. So, for example, when it was proposed after the Congress of Berlin (1878) that much territory, ineluding Thessaly and the city of Yenişehir (Larissa) with its large Muslim population, be ceded to Greece, the üttoman negotiators argued that it should not be done because Muslim public opinion would not accept this 6 • The basic principle was that the üttoman state was amodem state in which all subjects were üttomans, and as such were equal. But an associated principle was that the opinion of Muslims was of major importance.
A third principle was that the üttoman Empire was a legitimate European power, a member of the Concert of Europe. In the past, although the Empire had in fact been an important European power since the fourteenth century, it had never been a member of the "elub" of Christian monarchies. it had not been represented at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15 or at any of the meetings of great power monarchs or ministers that followed. But in 1840 and 1841, after the Tanzimat Fennam, the Bab-ı Ali became an active participant in the European state system of the day as co-signer of the London Conventian, which provided for actian against Mehmed Ali, and of the Straits Conventian. Even more significant was the fact that the üttoman Empire was represented at the Congress of Paris in 1856, after the Crimean War, with all the great powers of Europe. The Treaty of Paris, produced at that Congress, confinned that "the Sublime Porte is admitted to participation in the advantages of the European public lawand of the European concert" (Artiele 7). Thereafter üttoman statesmen never let their westem counterparts forget that the Empire was a legitimate European power, a member of the exelusive elub of great powers. The westemers usually acknowledged the truth of this. In 1868 the French foreign minister said to Cemi 1 Paşa that "Turkey, being one 6. Abdin Paşa note the powers, 26 July 1880, published in Edward Hertsler. The Map oj' Europe by Treaty, vol. 4 (London, 1891 ), p. 2971 of the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris, is thus admitted to the European concert, while Greece does not have those advantages". On that occasion, the meaning was that the Ottoman Empire would be invited to a conference of the great powers conceming the Cretan question and Greek-Turkish differences, while Greece would not be invited
•
Despite the insistence of the Ottoman statesmen on the principle of Ottoman membership in the Concert, the other members frequently failed to treat the Empire as an equal. The most gallings sign of inequality was the continuance of the capitulations, giying foreigners special rights on Ottoman soiL. In such a situation the Ottoman statesmen used the Concert principle as vigorously as they could. "By the treaty of Paris", says one ottoman memorandum, "the Sublime Porte was admitted to the bosom of the European family. This admission will be nothing but an expression so long as the Capitulations in existence between the Sublime Porte and the European Powers assure an exceptional position to foreigners living in Turkey ...."R A fourth principle was that existing legal regimes should be supported and that the principle of nationality, or of national self-determination, should not be allowed to subvert thern. Because the Ottoman Empire was made up of nothing but national minoritics -no single ethnic group or language group, not even the Turkish, constituted as much as 50 per cent-its very existence was threatened if the concept of national self-determination were admitted to be valid. Ali Paşa, many times foreign minister and grand vezir, opposed granting autonomy to various regions because "it would be impossible to prevent it from becoming rapidly and generally contagious"9. His collecague Fuad Paşa opposed the whole concept of creating homogeneous states based on nationality -the "agglomeration of races", he caııed it ıo . Alater foreign minister, Safvet Paşa, pointed out to the great powers of Europe that it was immoral to take provinces from one country just to make anather country happy. He was arguing against the transfer of territory from Ottoman to Greek rule because of the principle of nationalityl '. The Ottoman statesmen were not using arguments from the past -they were not maintaining that Islamic rule was superior and right. Instead, they were using modern secular arguments on the legitimacy of Ottoman rule, the legal anthority of a government recognized by all the powers, and the right of a government to suppress rebellion. Nationalist rebellian was rebellion, was ilIegal, and was subversive of the lawand order that all governments must uphold.
A fifth principle on which the Ottoman statesmen based their actions was that international law must be observed by all governments. This was western international law -the law of nations-to which the Porte turned naturally because that law tended to support the status quo, which is what the Porte alsa was trying to do. When in the 1860s Crete was in rebellion and the rebels were receiving aid from Greece, and when at the same time other Greeks were conducting raids into Ottoman Thessaly, Fuad Paşa appealed to international law. Even if Greece is a free country and its citizens can act freely, he said, they stilI must observe international law. "No country", he continued, "is allawed to make its own laws superior to what is called the law of nations, which alone can serve as the comman rule for international relations"l~. In many other instances the Ottoman diplomats appealed to internationallaw, as a kind of defensive insurance policy. It was an argument that governments understood.
A corollary of the same principle, but so important to the ottomans that it should be listed as a separate principle, a sixth one, is that treaties must be observed. This is a doctrine imbedded in communication of the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 to the powers "cannot in any case, give to the said powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects or in the internal administration of his empire"16. The European powers had interfered on many occasions in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire, often in favor of religious groups or national minarities, as well as individuals. After 1856 the Porte had abasis in treaty for its efforts to uphold the principle of the non-intervention by one state in the affairs of anather. Artiele 9 of the 1856 treaty was therafter often referred to by Ottoman diplomats in their communications to governments of the great powers of Europe. Cemil Paşa once even got the French foreign minister to agree that "the Ottoman Empire is a territory rendered sacred by the Treaty of Paris and on which no encroachment is allawed"]?
The seven principles that have been mentioned were all familiar to contemporary Europeans and were accepted as valid by the European powers. The first one -preservation of the OUoman Empire-was not a new principle, but it was modern as well as being traditional. The other six principles, or at least the form in which they were expressed, had been developed during the Tanzimat period: equality of OUoman subjects, along with a special regard for Muslim public opinion; Ottoman membership in the Concert of Europe; the preservation of legitimate sovereign regimes and opposition to nationalist rebellion; the upholding of international law; respect for the sanctity of treaties; and non-intervention in Ottoman domestic affairs. Only the last of these principles, non-intervention, was not thoroughly accepted by all of the powers, sine e Austria and Russia still be1ieved that on occasion interventian might be not only a right, but a duty. This is not to say that all, or even anyone, of the great powers of Europe lived up to professed principles in their international relations. it is to say i6. Text of treaty, ihid., vol. 3, S 8, d. 13 Mükerrer, Cemi) (Paris) to Safvet (İstanbul). unnumbered, 3 i December ) 868. bowever, that the Ottoman statesmen and diplomats were speaking the same language and arguing from the same principles as other great power representatives. In principles, in attitude, in modes of expression, Ottoman diplomacy was being modernized.
The method s used by Ottoman statesmen and diplomats also accomrnodated themselves to the contemporary European situation. The most important method was not at all new -it was, simply, to win the support of whatever major powers would back up Ottoman interests. In the nineteenth century Russia was the most consistent opponent of, and threat to, the ottoman Empire. Prussia, which after 1871 became Germany, was the least interested of all powers in the Eastern Question, Therefore, it was from Britain, France, and Austria that the Porte sought assistance, time and time again. These three had actually guaranteed the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire in 1856. They often failed to liye up to this promise. Nevertheless, the Ottoman records are full of appeals to these powers to support the interests of the Empire in this question or that. These records also convey the distinct impression that Ottoman statesmen as a rule believed British help was more likely and more efficacious than any other. From the 1830s onward, they were often successful in securing British backing, which of course the London government gaye for its own reasons, because British and Ottoman interests often coincided. The hope placed in British support was particularly urgent at the time of the defeat by Russia in 1877-78, a hope partly deceived during the armistice and peace negotiations and the Congress of BerlinIR. Nevertheless, until it became c1ear in the Iate 1880s that Britain would not soon evacuate Egypt, which had been occupied in 1882, the general method of Ottoman statesmen seemed to be : when all else fails, seek British support.
A second method of Ottoman diplomacy was to avoid participation in international conferences except in circumstances that were c10sely controlled. This may seem like a strange method 18. DBHE, S i20 and S 185, with many documents on these events. of doing international business, by avoiding iL But the Gttoman view on international conferences was bom of experience. The great powers of Europe, when meeting in conference, tended to make demands of the Dttoman Empire, to interfere in its internal affairs with proposals of reform, or to plan for its parti al dismembermenL In the days of Napoleon III and Cavour, between 1856 and 1870, conferences were doubly dangerous because the fertile imaginations of these two nationality-minded statesmen were full of map-changing schemes to remake Europe, almost always at Dttoman expense l9 • Even if the Porte were not represented at a conference, what the other powers did might injure Gttoman interests, and so the Porte sametimes tried to discourage such meetings. Dnly if the conference agende was limited and if the results were determined by an entente prealable was the Porte completely happy with an international conference. An example arises in 1864, when Ali Paşa actually himself proposed and convened a meeting of representatives of all the powers. Here the agenda was limited to approving an agreement aIready reached by Ali with Prince Cuza of Moldavia-Wallachia, the conference met at Ali's house in İstanbul, and agreement was assured in advance eo .
A third Dttoman method, comman to all governments in modem times, was to seek to influence public opinion in other countries, especially through the press. In 1858, because of calumnies in the European newspapers, the Porte created a Publicity Bureau to furnish regular news bulletins on current questions to all Dttoman representatives abroad e !. The bulletins had an irregular life, disapperiaring and being revived several times into the next century. The Dttoman diplomats alsa learned how to get European newspaper editors to publish storics favorable to their govemment, and how to place news stories with new spapers and ı9. For exarnple, the Porte argued against a five-power eonferenee that was proposed in 1860 : DB HE, S 46, d. 5. 20. DBHE, S 30, d. 36 press sercices. Musurus Paşa, for instance, as Gttoman ambassador in London, was able to fumish news despatches to Reuters
Perhaps the Porte was less effective in the se efforts than the westem powers, but it leamed rapidly and was competing on Europe's own terms.
A fourth Gttoman method, used only once, was to send the Sultan on a good-will visit to other powers. European monarchs in the nineteenth century often visited each other, doing business of state as well as traveling for pleasure. Gttoman rulers had traditionally gone beyond the frontiers of their own empire only at the head of an army. In 1876, at the strong urging of his ministers, Sultan Abdülaziz traveled to Paris, London, an Vienna, and made a stop in Germany too. The trip was a success; the Sultan evidenty made a good impression, and his minister Fuad along with the Sultan was able to counteract influence that Russia was exerting in Paris. But Abdülaziz never got the habit of European trips, as did his contemporaries Shah Nasreddin of Iran and Kbedive ısmail of Egypt. His successor, Sultan Abdülhamid II, was probably too fearful for his own safety to travel abroad. Abdülhamid did, however, play an active role in diplomacy, and was willing to write personal letters to other moranchs, as for example early in 1878 asking Queen Victoria for aid in the face of the Russian threat to İstanbul itself-
There were many other method s used by Gttoman statesmen and diplomats in their conduct of the empire's foreign relations. A large number of them can be group ed together as exemplifying the adoption of European techniques. Gttoman foreign ministers and their representatives in foreign capitals soon became familiar with the ways in which westem diplomats operated, and adopted them, using the formal diplomatic note, the informal suggestion a titre personelle, the despatch to read to a foreign minister of which copy may be left if desired, the circular despatch, the formalities of conference procedures, compte-rendus, proces-verbaux, protocols, and the other minutiae and niceties of European diplomatic practice. Some of the Ottoman ministers and ambassadors excelled in using the best diplomatic French, precise and polite phraseology. They became accustomed, especially in posts abroad, to the social amenities that facilitate diplomatic intercourse: receptions, dinner, balls, polite notes, ete. Af ter the telegraph system of Europe was extended to İstanbul in 1855, Ottoman diplomats quickly became used to employing that channel for urgent messages, and to using cyphers as well to keep their communications secret. In the Foreign Ministry in İstanbul western-style procedures gradually came into use for drafting documents, reviewing them, numbering them in both general series and in particular series by destination, writing precis of despatches, registering incoming and outgoing communications, and filing. it is interesting to see in the Foreign Ministry the evolution of printed forms to make the work of the ministry, and the flow of paper within it, more regular and more efficient 24 • When documents were finally filed, they were at first apparently tied in bundles, and presumably then placed in torbas. But at some point the Foreign Ministry began using folders, and the n cartons, in a western fashion, leading to greater efficiency in the location of documents. All these techniques may seem like smaIl matters. IndividuaIly, theyare.
But, taken together they helped the Ottoman statesmen and diplomats to work as effectively as they could in the world of the European great powers. That was the world in which they had to work if the Ottoman Empire was to survive.
These principles, methods, and techniques of Ottoman diplomacy, largely adopted or adapted from nineteenth-century 24. See, for example, a single carton with docııments extending over a qııarter of a century, from 1861 to 1887, showing changes in form s : DBHE, S 531, on Bosnia.
European models, and developed primarily in the Tanzimat period, did not succeed in saving the OUoman Empire in the long run. But they did help to prolong its life and to make it a more comfortable and acceptable participant in the international state system in the pre-1914 days, when that system was dominated by the European powers.
